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First Amendment Freedoms Diluted:
The Impact of Disclosure Requirements on Nonprofit
Charities
BY: BAILIE MITTMAN *
INTRODUCTION
Since the birth of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment have been cherished by all members of this nation. The First
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.” 1 Over time, courts have acknowledged that the freedom to speak freely
means very little if the guarantee is not protected by an additional right: the freedom
to associate. 2 Thus, the freedom of expressive association stands as an essential
component of an individual’s free speech rights and state infringement on associative
rights has the power of potentially chilling speech, especially from an organizational
standpoint.
Throughout the relatively short history of the right to associate, the courts
traditionally applied strict scrutiny to governmental attempts to intervene in
organizations, whether such intervention be via imposing penalties on disfavored
groups, requiring disclosure of membership groups, or attempting to interfere with a
group’s internal organization or affairs. 3 However, in two recent cases, Citizens
United v. Schneiderman and Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, two
different appellate courts found the freedom of expressive association of either
organization was not infringed upon when applying intermediate, exacting scrutiny
to state laws mandating the disclosure of nonprofit organizations’ annual Form
990s. 4 These forms, filed yearly with the IRS to maintain tax-exempt status, include
a Schedule B that contains a list of the names and addresses of all significant donors
to the organization. 5 The plaintiffs in both cases argued the forced disclosure of these
donors would chill the organization’s freedom of speech rights by making it more
difficult to secure donations from individuals who feared being publicly associated
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Bailie Mittman is a third-year law student at the IU Maurer School of Law in
Bloomington, Indiana. Special thanks to Professor Jeannine Bell for the opportunity and
guidance during the note-writing process.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (“According protection to
collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and
cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.”).
3. See infra Part I.
4. Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 2018); Ams. for
Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 2018).
5. A model Schedule B form can be found at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990ezb.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4Z8-ZYAF]. See also infra notes 57–61 and
accompanying text.
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with organizations promoting various minority viewpoints. 6 Ultimately, both
appellate courts found these arguments to be unpersuasive and upheld the state laws. 7
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the history and evolution of the freedom of
association before articulating what the doctrine looks like today. Part II summarizes
the decisions in Citizens United and Americans for Prosperity Foundation while
analyzing the reasoning used by both courts in reaching their decisions. Finally, Part
III weighs the merits of this decision by considering the arguments raised by both
sides both during and in the wake of the decisions. This Note concludes that the
appellate courts veered away from traditional preferences of protecting First
Amendment rights by upholding a state-sanctioned, non-political disclosure
requirement for non-profit charities. Both appellate courts reached this conclusion
by applying a less rigorous scrutiny test than that normally applied to statutes with
the potential of affecting First Amendment freedoms.
PART I: THE HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Understanding the history of the expansion of First Amendment rights to include
the freedom of association, especially the standard of review the courts tend to apply
to this right, is beneficial in understanding how the recent decisions in Schneiderman
and Becerra veer from usual decisions pertinent to First Amendment law. 8 Since the
1950’s, it has been “beyond debate that [the] freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of . . . ‘liberty.’” 9 This
right is enshrined in the First Amendment freedom of speech and incorporated to the
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
Freedom of association was first clearly articulated in the landmark case NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. In that case, the state of Alabama passed a statute
compelling foreign corporations, including the NAACP, to disclose to the state’s
Attorney General the names and addresses of all its members and agents, regardless
of their position or prominence within the organization. 11 Individuals living in
Alabama in the 1950s were likely reluctant to publicly associate themselves with the
NAACP for fear of retaliatory actions, or even physical harm, from others living in
the state who strongly opposed the civil rights movement and racial equality. 12
Accordingly, in order to protect themselves and their families, many people would
no longer want to be associated with the organization if the state was going to be
informed about that association. In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court
found the statute equated to state action that might curtail the freedom of associating

6. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 381; Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1013.
7. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 390; Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1020.
8. See Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374 (applying exacting scrutiny to an a-political
disclosure law targeting nonprofit charities); Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000 (same).
9. NAACP v. Ala. ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
10. Id.
11. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 451.
12. Id. at 462 (“Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions
revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
hostility.”).
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by instilling fear, harassment, or other harms in potential members, and, therefore,
subjected the statute to the “closest scrutiny.” 13 In doing so, the Court noted the “vital
relationship” between the freedom to associate and the privacy of an individual’s
associations, 14 before ultimately determining the state’s interest in using the
membership lists was not compelling. 15 Thus, the NAACP’s judicial fine and
contempt charge for refusal to comply with the law were overturned. 16
Throughout the next few years, the Court continually found that the freedom to
associate, as well as the right to associate privately, was extremely important, which
resulted in the Court striking down several state statutes attempting to infringe upon
those rights. 17 Subsequent decades saw the rise of the doctrine of substantive due
process accompanied by an expansion of the concept of the right to associate in a
social, legal, and economic sense. 18 At the end of this era, the courts saw association
as a “form of expression of opinion” whose “existence is necessary in making the
express guarantees [of the First Amendment] meaningful.” 19
The next major freedom of association case, Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
came in 1984. 20 This case was the first to define the two distinct ways in which the
freedom of association had been applied throughout its history. 21 In one sense, as
seen in Griswold and other substantive due process cases, the freedom of association
represents a fundamental element of personal liberty that allows individuals to be
secure in their relationships; 22 this is known as the freedom of “intimate
association.” 23 The other, more pertinent, application of the freedom of association
is as a mechanism to engage in activity protected by the First Amendment 24—also

13. Id. at 460–61.
14. Id. at 462.
15. Id. at 464. The State argued that the membership lists could serve as evidence of
organizations violating Alabama’s intrastate commerce law. Id.
16. Id. at 466.
17. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (determining that the
power to tax was not a controlling justification for the deterrence of free association caused
by compulsory disclosure of membership lists); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(finding that while the state has a compelling interest in inquiring as to the fitness and
competence of teachers, the unlimited scope of the statute requiring association disclosure, as
well as the lack of required confidentiality, results in an overbroad and intrusive statute).
18. Griswold v. Connecticut., 381 US. 479, 483 (1965) (“[W]e have protected forms of
‘association’ that are not political in the customary sense but pertain to the social, legal, and
economic benefit of the members.”). See also, Wayne Batchis, Article, Citizens United and
the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Freedom of Association to Freedom of the
Association, 36 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 5, 16 (2012) (“[T]he Court had issued
numerous decisions addressing associational rights through the prism of substantive due
process cases . . . .”).
19. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
20. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609.
21. Id. at 617 (“Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected ‘freedom of
association’ in two distinct senses.”).
22. Id. at 617–18 (“[C]hoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State . . . .”).
23. Id. at 618.
24. Id. (recognizing “a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities
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known as “expressive association.” 25 The Court noted that, in some instances, both
aspects of association might be implicated, and the degree of constitutional
protection awarded by the freedom varies with the type of association in question. 26
In Roberts, the U.S. Jaycees, an organization dedicated to the growth of young
men’s civic groups throughout the country, 27 sought an injunction, as well as
declaratory relief, from a Minnesota statute that would require the group to admit
women as members. 28 The Court quickly determined the relationships among
members were not personal enough to qualify for protection under the freedom of
intimate association before moving to the more difficult question of expressive
association. 29 The Court acknowledged that the Minnesota statute infringes on the
expressive rights of the Jaycees because it attempts to “interfere with the internal
organization or affairs of the group” 30 by forcing the organization to admit women,
despite a universally recognized freedom not to associate with women, if so
desired. 31 Despite this significant organizational interest, the Court found that the
freedom of expressive association was not absolute, and the state’s compelling
interest in preventing gender discrimination within its society justified the
infringement on the rights of the male Jaycees. 32
For the next fifteen years, the Court continued to identify the right to expressive
association as a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment, subject to
limitations in the presence of a compelling state interest. 33 It was not until 2000, in

protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances,
and the exercise of religion”).
25. Id.
26. Id. (“[W]hen the State interferes with individuals’ selection of those with whom they
wish to join in a common endeavor, freedom of association in both of its forms may be
implicated . . . . [T]he nature and degree of association may vary depending on the extent wo
which one or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given
case.”).
27. Id. at 612.
28. Id. at 615.
29. Id. at 619–21 (“[S]everal features of the Jaycees clearly place the organization outside
of the category of relationships worthy of this kind of protection.”). These ‘factors’ included
the size and lack of selectivity within the groups, no restrictions beyond age and sex, and the
participation of strangers in group membership. Id.
30. Id. at 623.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 624 (“We are persuaded that Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to
the Jaycees may have on the male members’ associational freedoms.”).
33. In chronological order, see, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987) (“[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to
Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the existing members’ ability to carry out their
various purposes.”); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)
(finding the rights of a nonprofit club’s members were not affected in a “significant way” by
a local law forbidding membership admission solely based on race or sex); Dallas v. Stanglin,
490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (finding the act of minors coming together to engage in recreational
dancing is not protected by the First Amendment) (“It is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes . . . but such a kernel is not sufficient
to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”).
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Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, that the Supreme Court again significantly added to
the Freedom of Association doctrine. 34 Respondent James Dale was a former Eagle
Scout whose Boy Scout membership was revoked when the organization discovered
that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. 35 The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that, under the state’s public accommodations law, the organization could
not exclude Dale on the basis of sexual orientation. 36 The United States Supreme
Court, however, found that the law violated the First Amendment right to expressive
association. 37 In doing so, the Court held that when determining the availability of
this First Amendment protection to a certain group, it must first be demonstrated that
the “group engages in ‘expressive association.’” 38 This requirement can be satisfied
by “some” sort of expression, public or private. 39 If such expression can be proven,
as it was for the Boy Scouts, then the Court must analyze the impact of compliance
with the statute on an organization’s ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints. 40
In Dale, the Court found that, as an organization, the Boy Scouts had both publicly
and privately disavowed homosexuality. 41 The Court first reasoned that forcing the
organization to reinstate Dale would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’
expression, 42 before debating which tier of scrutiny should be applied to the New
Jersey public accommodation statute, 43 and ultimately determining the same test
used in Roberts should be applied—balancing the state’s compelling interest with
the burden on an organization’s expressive association rights. 44 Unlike Roberts,
however, the state’s interest was not compelling enough to justify such a “severe
intrusion” on the Boy Scouts, and therefore the organization did not have to reinstate
Dale. 45

34. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
35. Id. at 644.
36. Id. at 646.
37. Id. at 644.
38. Id. at 648.
39. Id. (“[T[o come within [First Amendment protection], a group must engage in some
form of expression, whether it is public or private.”).
40. Id. at 650 (“It seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit . . . a system
of values engages in expressive activity.”).
41. Id. at 651–52 (summarizing the historical teachings of the Boy Scouts, convincing the
Court that the organization believes “homosexual conduct is not morally straight”).
42. Id. at 656 (concluding the forced inclusion of the petitioner in the organization would
“significantly affect [the Boy Scout’s] expression”).
43. Id. at 658–59 (“[I]n [past associational freedom] cases, the associational interest in
freedom of expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State’s interest on the
other.”).
44. Id. (“New Jersey’s public accommodations law directly and immediately affects
associational rights . . . associational rights that enjoy First Amendment protection.”).
45. Id. at 661 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995)) (“‘While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct
in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either
purpose may strike the government.”’).
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Just six years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the freedom of expressive
association in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. 46 In this
case, the Supreme Court found that compelling law schools to host military recruiters
on their campuses in order to receive federal funding did not violate the freedom of
speech either directly, by compelling speech, or indirectly, by violating expressive
association rights. 47 When comparing the situation with that in Dale, the Court found
that the law schools’ associational rights were not affected in the same way because
both students and faculty are free to voice their disapproval of the military’s Don’t
Ask Don’t Tell policies. 48 Therefore, the Court upheld the congressional statute
requiring military recruiting on campuses. 49
Finally, in 2010, the Supreme Court addressed a variety of speech and
associational issues in the seminal case, Citizens United v. FEC. 50 In regard to the
First Amendment speech and association rights, the Court noted that “First
Amendment standards . . . ‘must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather
than stifling speech.’” 51 The Court ultimately found that a statute criminalizing
corporate advocacy of an election candidate within thirty days of a primary election
was an unconstitutional infringement on the freedom of speech 52 under a strict
scrutiny analysis. 53 The statute also required annual filings of disclosure statements
with the FEC by any individual spending greater than $10,000 on election
communications within that year. 54 Citing to previous campaign finance cases,
including Buckley v. Valeo and McConnell v. FEC, the Court found this portion of
the statute was only subject to “exacting scrutiny,” and thus required only a
“substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently
important’ government interest.” 55 While holding the disclosure statutes valid in this
situation, the Court noted that if a group can demonstrate a “reasonable probability”
that disclosure of donors’ names would “subject them to threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties,” then the relevant
statute is deemed unconstitutional as applied. 56

46. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
47. Id. at 69 (“Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the
limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the school’s expressive
association.”).
48. Id. (“Unlike the public accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does
not force a law school to ‘accept members it does not desire.’”) (quoting Dale, 530 U.S.at
648).
49. Id. at 70 (reversing and remanding “[b]ecause Congress could require law schools to
provide equal access to military recruiters without violating the schools’ freedoms of speech
or association . . .”).
50. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
51. Id. at 327 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)).
52. Id. at 337.
53. Id. at 340 (“Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny . . . .’”)
(quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 464).
54. Id. at 366. See also 52 U.S.C. § 30104 (f)(1).
55. Id. at 366–67 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1976)).
56. Id. at 367 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003)).
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This background set the groundwork for two 2018 First Amendment cases,
Citizens United v. Schneiderman and Americans for Prosperity Foundation v.
Becerra, that could potentially impact nonprofit organizations across the country.
PART II: THE NONPROFIT CASES – SCHNEIDERMAN AND BECERRA
There are approximately 1.6 million tax-exempt organizations in the United States
that received a combined $390 billion as a result of charitable giving in 2016. 57 Many
of these organizations promote education or public awareness about various issues,
including, in some instances, controversial topics. 58 These organizations allow
individuals the opportunity to associate with others who have similar beliefs and
present these views to the public. Just as was seen in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, it is possible that public association with these organizations could chill
speech. 59 In recent years, however, states have begun requiring more and more
disclosures from nonprofit organizations pertaining to individual membership and
charitable giving. The Second and Ninth Circuits were the first appellate courts to be
presented with the question this Part analyzes: does compelled disclosure of a
nonprofit organization’s Schedule B form to a state official a violation of First
Amendment rights?
Organizations that qualify under IRC § 501(a) are exempt from being taxed by
the IRS. 60 Despite their tax-exempt status, however, these organizations are required
to file an annual informational return, known as an Annual Form 990. 61 The purpose
of such a return is to assist the IRS in ensuring tax-exempt organizations are
conducting themselves appropriately to maintain their exempt status. 62 One
mandatory component of the Annual Form 990 is the Schedule B. This form requires
nonprofit organizations to disclose the names, addresses, and total yearly
contributions of significant donors. 63 While this information must be provided to the
IRS, the IRS is, in turn, prohibited from publicly disclosing donor information from
the Schedule B, 64 in conformity with the ideals of the freedom of expressive
association.

57. The Charitable Sector, THE INDEP. SECTOR, https://independentsector.org/about/thecharitable-sector/ [https://perma.cc/VJ74-D98J].
58. For example, in 2016 the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) identified fifty-five
organizations with charitable, tax-exempt status that the SPLC classified as “hate groups.”
Eden Stiffman, Dozens of ‘Hate Groups’ Have Charity Status, Chronicle Study Finds, THE
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Dozens-ofHate-Groups-/238748 [https://perma.cc/QBL2-RTVC].
59. See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text.
60. I.R.C. § 501(a).
61. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (requiring Annual Form 990).
62. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 382. See also About Schedule B (Form 990, 990-EZ, 990PF), Schedule of Contributors, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/formspubs/about-schedule-b-form-990-990-ez-or-990-pf
[https://perma.cc/M4P3-7AMM]
(explaining the purpose and use of the Schedule B).
63. See 26 C.F.R. 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(F); see also supra note 5.
64. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(3)(A) (outlining exceptions to the public disclosure requirement and
stating that unless the organization is a private foundation or a political organization, the
organization is not required to publicly disclose the name or address of any contributors to the
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State governments are similarly concerned with ensuring the honest actions of
nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations. 65 In an effort to combat this fear, two states,
California and New York, passed laws requiring organizations seeking to solicit taxdeductible donations within the state to provide an annual submission of their Form
990s, including the organization’s Schedule B, to a state official. 66 Organizations
within both states that are subject to these disclosure requirements exist to promote
viewpoints that express the opinions of the minority or are otherwise controversial. 67
These types of organizations fear the additional disclosure requirements will result
in an intimidation of donors, leading to a subsequent decrease in donations and,
consequently, a chilling of the organizations’ speech. 68 To better understand both
sides of the issue, it is necessary to take a more-in-depth look at the opinions and
decisions in both Schneiderman and Becerra.
A. The First Challenge to State Disclosure Laws – New York: Citizens United v.
Schneiderman
In Schneiderman, the plaintiffs consisted of two branches of the Citizens United
organization; one branch is a 501(c)(3) organization, and the other a 501(c)(4). 69

organization).
65. See Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 378; see also Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1009.
66. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12584 (mandating the Attorney General to “establish and
maintain a register of charitable corporations . . .” and allowing the Attorney General to
“conduct whatever investigation is necessary”); N.Y. Exec. Law § 172(1) (“Every charitable
organization . . . which intends to solicit contributions from persons in this state or from any
governmental agency shall . . . file with the attorney general a prescribed registration form . .
. .”).
67. For example, Citizens United, the plaintiff in Schneiderman, is a largely conservative
organization based in Judeo-Christian values that champions a belief in God and the family as
the
center
of
society.
What
is
Citizens
United,
Citizens
United,
http://www.citizensunited.org/what-we-do.aspx [https://perma.cc/KTF4-TEGW]. Similarly,
the plaintiff in Becerra, the Americans for Prosperity Foundation is a strongly conservative
organization with significant political influence. See Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Caroline
Tervo & Theda Skocpol, How the Koch Brothers Built the Most Powerful Rightwing Group
You’ve Never Heard of, The Guardian (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/sep/26/koch-brothers-americans-for-prosperity-rightwing-political-group
[https://perma.cc/EC2D-BU7Y].
68. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 381 (summarizing the appellants’ argument that “donors .
. . fear having their names associated with [] controversial beliefs . . ..”).
69. Id. at 378. 501(c)(3) organizations are tax exempt due to the nature of their charitable
purpose. This purpose can broadly be encompassed to include religious, educational, or
scientific goals and cannot substantially be associated with a political agenda. On the other
hand, 501(c)(4) organizations include social welfare organizations; these entities are permitted
to engage in political speech and lobbying. Lincoln Arneal, The Differences Between a
501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), and Other Tax Exemptions, Nonprofit Hub (Sept. 8, 2015),
https://nonprofithub.org/starting-a-nonprofit/differences-501c3-501c4-tax-exemptions/
[https://perma.cc/KY99-4L7N]. While both the political and the educational sectors of
Citizen’s United argued against the disclosure requirements, the key argument of this Note is
that 501(c)(3)—charitable organizations—should not be subject to these disclosure
requirements.
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Both are subject to the Schedule B requirements from the IRS 70 as well as the state
of New York disclosure requirements. 71 For nearly twenty years, both Citizens
United branches submitted only the first page of their Schedule B to the state,
redacting the information containing personal information of members, and did not
hear a complaint from New York state officials. 72 In 2013, however, the Attorney
General notified both organizations of their failure to comply with the disclosure
requirements and that this failure, if not corrected, had the potential to result in a
revocation of solicitation rights within the state. 73 In response, Citizens United filed
a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York, where the motion to dismiss was
granted to the defendant state for the plaintiffs’ failure to state a First Amendment
claim and a consequential lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the federal court. 74
The case then made its way on appeal to the Second Circuit, where the First
Amendment claims drew more attention and a deeper analysis.
At the Second Circuit, Citizens United made two key First Amendment claims:
that (1) the regulation intimidated potential donors from contributing, undermining
the organization’s ability to speak, and that (2) the disclosure requirement was an
unconstitutional prior restraint on the nonprofit organizations’ ability to solicit
donations. 75 The court reviewed both claims in turn.
Regarding the fear of chilling speech and expression claim, the plaintiffs argued
this case was similar to NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson as both statutes would
result in the intimidation, and subsequent reduction, of their donors. 76 Therefore, the
plaintiffs sought a strict scrutiny application that would result in the New York statute
being struck down. 77 The Second Circuit, however, was not persuaded by this
argument and stated that strict scrutiny is only pertinent in First Amendment cases
when “a law ‘applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea
or message expressed’ or [when] ‘facially neutral content . . . cannot be justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’ including preventing
expression from disfavored speakers.” 78 Relying on Citizens United v. FEC, the court
instead decided to apply “exacting scrutiny,” as they saw this statute as a contentneutral disclosure requirement. 79 The court noted that Citizens United v. FEC used
exacting scrutiny to uphold a disclosure requirement in the realm of election law and

70. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 379; see also I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (“[E]very organization
exempt from taxation under section 501(a) shall file an annual return . . ..”).
71. Id. at 379; see also N.Y.COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13 § 91.5(c)(3)(i)(a) (requiring
a charitable organization’s annual disclosures to include the Schedule B).
72. Id. at 379.
73. Id. at 379–80.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 381.
76. Id. (“The basis of the Appellants’ first challenge is an analogy to the landmark
decision in National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama
ex re. Patterson.”).
77. Id. (arguing that Citizen United’s political advocacy has resulted in societal notoriety
and threats from opponents that resulted in donors fearing public association with the
organization).
78. Id. at 381–82 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015)).
79. Id. at 382 (“Disclosure requirements are not inherently content-based nor do they
inherently discriminate among speakers.”).
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political speech, which the court indicated it saw as an area of speech with greater
protections than charitable giving; since political speech should be awarded higher
protections than nonprofit speech, in the eyes of this court, this situation thus required
the use of exacting scrutiny. 80 Therefore, the standard of review that applied to the
New York disclosure statute required a “‘substantial relation between the disclosure
requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest’ where ‘the strength
of the governmental interest’ is commensurate with ‘the seriousness of the actual
burden on First Amendment rights.’” 81 This intermediate, or exacting, standard,
while still a form of heightened scrutiny, is much more deferential to the states than
strict scrutiny but still requires a more significant governmental interest than one that
is merely “legitimate.” 82
With the test identified, the Second Circuit next weighed the required factors. 83
The state argued that an important government interest exists in protecting the public
from “fraud and self-dealing among tax-exempt organizations.” 84 The mandatory
requirements helped achieve this goal by providing a “complete picture of [the]
charities’ operations.” 85 The appellate court agreed this was an important state
interest, and therefore proceeded to assess the sufficiency of the important interest
by balancing the state’s interest with the First Amendment burdens felt by the
nonprofits subject to the statute. 86
Despite acknowledging that a reasonable person might hesitate before donating
to an organization with these disclosure requirements, 87 the court found that the
“First Amendment[-] shield” will only be raised when an organization “presents well
pleaded facts” demonstrating the “likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the
exercise by [its] members of their right to freedom of association.” 88 Under this
standard, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that a
substantial number of nonprofits were likely to experience chilled speech from this
disclosure requirement to satisfy a facial challenge. 89 The court placed special

80. Id. (“If disclosure requirements receive only exacting scrutiny in that circumstance,
we cannot see why they would receive closer scrutiny elsewhere”) (emphasis in original).
81. Id. (quoting Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010)).
82. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (finding “compelled disclosure in itself,
can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment,” and therefore “cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate
governmental interest”).
83. See Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 382 (balancing the strength of the governmental
interest with the seriousness of the burden on First Amendment rights).
84. Id. (arguing the Schedule B allows government to note if the charity is doing business
with a major donor).
85. Id. (citing Brief for Appellee at 46–48) (reasoning that investigative efficiency is
facilitated with this information).
86. Id. at 382–83 (“We agree with the importance of the government’s interests in
ensuring organizations that receive special tax treatment do not abuse that privilege and . . .
preventing those organizations from using donations for [other] purposes . . . .”).
87. Id. at 383 (“An individual who seeks to advance a cause might reasonably hesitate
knowing that an officer of the state will see that they have done so.”).
88. Id. (quoting Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462).
89. Id. at 384 (“While we think it plausible that some donors will find it intolerable for
law enforcement officers to know where they have made donations, we see no reason to
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emphasis on the fact that the statute did not require any additional information
beyond that which is being submitted to the IRS as well as the statute’s requirement
that donor information could not be made public by the state. 90 Furthermore, the
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate they had experienced the requisite impact
necessary for a successful as-applied challenge. 91 Thus, the court remained
unconvinced that New York’s disclosure requirement would “impermissibly chill”
the speech of the organization or of its donors. 92
The Second Circuit then turned to the second theory raised by the plaintiffs: that
the statue imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on the entities’ ability to solicit
donations. 93 The court began their analysis by noting the seriousness with which
courts have regarded prior restraints pertaining to First Amendment rights 94 and
identifying two traditional types, of which only one is relevant to the case at hand: a
“facially neutral law that sets up an administrative apparatus with the power and
discretion to weed out disfavored expression before it occurs.” 95 Such laws are only
prior restraints when they (1) forbid expression without permission of a government
official and (2) vest discretionary power with the individual to an extent it could be
abused. 96 In this case, the plaintiffs were only contesting the annual filing
requirements and the state’s authority to remove solicitation rights if the disclosure
mandates are not satisfied. 97 The appellate court did not see this as a prior restraint,
but rather a remedial measure, necessary for enforcement purposes, only imposed if
the nonprofit does not follow the law. 98 Thus, since there was no reason to doubt the
statute was being applied in a uniform and content neutral fashion, the plaintiff’s
prior restraint claim also fell short. 99 Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s dismissal of the case and the statute was deemed permissible. 100

believe that this risk of speech chilling is more than that which comes with any disclosure
regulation.”).
90. Id. (“We would be dealing with a more difficult question if these disclosures went
beyond the officials in the Attorney General’s office charged with enforcing New York’s
charity regulations.”).
91. Id. at 385 (“[A]ll we have to go on is a bare assertion that the Attorney General has a
vendetta against the Appellants . . . That is a far cry from the clear and present danger that
white supremacist vigilantes and their abettors in the Alabama state government presented to
members of the NAACP in the 1950s.”).
92. Id.
93. Id. (arguing that being forced to register with the state and to file an annual donor list
will restrain their ability to solicit donations).
94. Id. at 386 (“[P]rior restraints constitute ‘the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement’ on our freedoms of speech . . . .”) (citing Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 559 (1976)).
95. Id. at 387.
96. Id. (internal citations omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 388 (“Prevention of [the Appellants’] solicitation can only arise if they fail to
comply with content-neutral, unambiguous, and narrowly drawn standards for disclosure . . .
and then only after warning and opportunity to cure.”).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 390.
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B. The Second Challenge - California: Americans for Prosperity Foundation v.
Becerra
Less than a year later, a nearly identical case arose in the Ninth Circuit in relation
to California’s nonprofit disclosure law. 101 The plaintiffs were two 501(c)(3)
organizations, Americans for Prosperity Foundation and the Thomas More Law
Center, who contested the imposition of California’s Supervision of Trustees and
Charitable Trusts Act. 102 The Act requires nonprofits wanting to solicit taxdeductible donations within the state to submit their annual Form 990’s, including
the Schedule B, to the state Attorney General. 103 Like the state of New York and the
IRS, California makes nonprofits’ Form 990 publicly available 104 but withholds the
Schedule B from public inspection. 105 For over ten years, both plaintiffs had either
filed redacted versions of their Schedule B Forms or excluded the form from their
annual submissions to the state entirely. 106 In 2012 and 2013, the two plaintiffs were
respectively notified of their disclosure deficiencies, resulting in both plaintiffs
bringing suit. 107
While these separately filed cases were ongoing in the district court 108, the Ninth
Circuit heard and decided another case related to nonprofit disclosures, Center for
Competitive Politics v. Harris. 109 There, the appellate court held that the Schedule B
requirement satisfies exacting scrutiny while leaving open the possibility for an asapplied challenge in the future by plaintiffs who could show a reasonable probability
that the disclosure would subject the organization or its members to “threats,
harassments, or reprisals.” 110 Despite this ruling, the district courts in both the
Americans for Prosperity Foundation and the Thomas More Law Center cases found
the plaintiffs had proved an ample risk of harm if their information became public
and therefore enjoined the state from mandating the Schedule B requirement on the
plaintiff organizations. 111 The cases were then combined, under the name Americans
for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, to be heard in front of the Ninth Circuit. 112

101. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1009.
102. Id. at 1004.
103. Id. See also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12584 (requiring the Attorney General to maintain a
registry of charitable corporations and to obtain whatever information needed for the registry’s
maintenance).
104. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12590.
105. CAL. CODE REGS. Tit. 11, § 310 (July 8, 2016). See also Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1005.
106. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1006.
107. Id. (arguing the Schedule B requirement in an unconstitutional burden on First
Amendment rights).
108. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Harris, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158851 (D.C.C.D.C.
Nov. 16, 2016); Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Harris, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (C.C.C.D. Ca.
2016).
109. 784 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2015).
110. Id. at 1317 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 at 74).
111. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Harris, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158851, at *1 (D.C.C.D.
Ca. Nov. 16, 2016); Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Harris, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 1059.
112. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1007.
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With much less consideration of strict scrutiny than the Second Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit chose to apply exacting scrutiny to the disclosure requirement. 113 In doing so,
the court first looked at the strength of the governmental interest. 114 The plaintiffs
argued that the Attorney General does not use the information provided on the
Schedule B often enough to justify requiring it from all charities, and instead should
request it from those under investigation. 115 The Ninth Circuit found that requiring
all charities to submit their Schedule B aided in investigative efficiency. 116 With
additional support from the Second Circuit’s Schneiderman opinion, the court
reached the conclusion that the disclosure requirement serves an important
governmental interest 117 by assisting the state in ensuring charities are not “engaging
in self-dealing, improper loans, or other unfair business practices.” 118
The appellate court then analyzed the severity of the First Amendment burden
imposed by the statute’s enforcement. 119 The plaintiffs argued that mandated
Schedule B disclosure will impose a First Amendment burden in two ways: (1) by
deterring contributors and (2) by subjecting donors to “threats, harassment, and
reprisals.” 120 In regards to a deterrence of contributors, the court held that the
evidence both plaintiffs offered only showed that “some individuals who have or
would support the plaintiffs may be deterred from contributing if the plaintiffs are
required to submit their Schedule Bs to the Attorney General.” 121 The court again
referenced Schneiderman before determining this remote possibility of deterrence
was not a “substantial burden” on First Amendment rights 122 and noted this
requirement is not a “sweeping one” as it only pertains to the organizations’ largest
contributors—many of whom are required to publicize their expenditures under
federal private foundation law. 123

113. Id. at 1008 (requiring “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and
a sufficiently important governmental interest”) (internal citations omitted).
114. Id. at 1009 (“It is clear that the disclosure requirement serves an important
governmental interest.”).
115. Id. at 1010 (arguing the Schedule B requirement is unnecessary in most instances and
can be obtained via subpoenas and audits in other instances).
116. Id. (reasoning that sufficient donor information increases investigative efficiency by
allowing the Attorney General to flag suspicious activity).
117. Id. (“We agree with the Second Circuit that disclosure requirement ‘clearly further[s]’
the state’s ‘important government interests’ in ‘preventing fraud and self-dealing in charities
. . . by making it easier to police for such fraud.’”) (quoting Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 384).
118. Id. at 1009 (quoting Ctr. for Competitive Politics v. Harris, 784 F.3d 1307, 1317 (9th
Cir. 2015)).
119. Id. at 1012.
120. Id. at 1013.
121. Id. at 1014 (emphasis in original).
122. Id. (“‘While we think it plausible that some donors will find it intolerable for law
enforcement officials to know where they have made donations, we see no reason to believe
that this risk of speech chilling is more than that which comes with any disclosure
regulation.’”) (quoting Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 384).
123. Id. at 1015 (“[T]he Schedule B requirement is a far cry from the broad and
indiscriminate disclosure laws passed in the 1950s to harass and intimidate members of
unpopular organizations.”).
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When it came to the question of whether there was a reasonable probability the
Schedule B disclosures to the Attorney General would subject the organization’s
contributors to harm, the court asked, first, what was the risk of public disclosure,
and second, if public disclosure occurred, whether it would lead to threats or
harassment. 124
While acknowledging that public disclosure of Schedule B information was
prohibited under the 2016 statute, 125 the plaintiffs argued that the state tended to
frequently violate this law due to a lack of security. 126 The Ninth Circuit conceded
this point but recognized that the state had begun to make significant internal changes
to mitigate this issue. 127 After again citing to Schneiderman 128, the court held that the
possibility of error, without proof of deficient or substandard security protocols, did
not equate to enough evidence to conclude the existence of a high risk of public
disclosure. 129
The failure to prove a likelihood of public disclosures renders the question of
retaliation moot. 130 While not reaching any conclusions, the court did note that while
there is a possibility of retaliation, the plaintiffs’ argument was weakened by a recent
media exposé of the America for Prosperity Foundation’s Schedule Bs. 131 The
organization failed to introduce into evidence anything to suggest that retaliation had

124. Id. (determining that finding a reasonable probability of danger from compelled
disclosure entails two separate questions).
125. See CAL. CODE REGS. Tit. 11, § 310 (July 8, 2016) (“Donor information exempt from
public inspection pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 6104(d)(3)(A) shall be
maintained as confidential by the Attorney General.”); see also Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1017
(discussing the legality of public disclosure).
126. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1018 (identifying two types of error (human error and software
vulnerability) historically made by the California Attorney General resulting in insecure
information).
127. Id. (noting that the Attorney General’s office has made efforts to fix software
vulnerabilities when they are identified, but maintaining an ongoing concern about the
possibility of human error despite the implementation of new procedural quality checks).
128. Id. at 1019 (“‘Any form of disclosure based regulation — indeed, any regulation at
all — comes with some risk of abuse. This background risk does not present constitutional
problems.’”) (quoting Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 383).
129. Id. (“‘[T]here is always a risk somebody in the Attorney General’s office will let
information slip notwithstanding an express prohibition. But if the sheer possibility that a
government agent will fail to live up to her duties were enough for us to assume those duties
were not binding, hardly any government action would withstand our positively philosophical
skepticism.’”) (quoting Schneiderman, 882 F.3d at 384).
130. Id. at 1017 (“[W]e are not persuaded that there exists a reasonable probability that the
plaintiffs’ Schedule B information will become public . . . Thus, the plaintiffs have not
established a reasonable probability of retaliation.”).
131. Id. See also Alex Seitz-Wald, David Koch Provided Seed Money for Americans for
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
24,
2013),
Prosperity,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/david-koch-seeded-major-tea-partygroup-private-donor-list-reveals/310700/ [https://perma.cc/ALV9-QYMF] (“[A] donor list
filed with the IRS labeled ‘not open for public inspection’ from 2003, the year of AFP’s first
filing, lists David Koch as by far the single largest contributor to its foundations, donating
$85,000.”).
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occurred after the media published the forms, suggesting the retaliation concern was
not as significant as the plaintiffs insisted. 132
This holistic analysis led the Ninth Circuit to the conclusion that the Schedule B
requirements satisfied exacting scrutiny and did not impose a significant enough First
Amendment burden on the plaintiff organizations to justify enjoining the state from
demanding the organizations’ Schedule Bs in the future. 133 Thus, the district court
decisions were reversed, and the statute was upheld both facially and as applied to
both the Americans for Prosperity Foundation and the Thomas More Law Center. 134
PART III: WAS THIS THE RIGHT OUTCOME IN EITHER OF THESE CASES?
In the wake of the Schneiderman and Becerra decisions, nonprofits have suffered
from a reduction of their First Amendment rights 135—a reduction that might result
in negative, long-term impacts to those organizations attempting to promote and
express controversial or minority opinions in society. Many have expressed the view
that these cases were wrongly decided, citing First Amendment concerns and a lack
of necessity for these types of laws as major reasons why. 136 In fact, the Becerra
plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States on August 26, 2019. 137 Ultimately, this Part argues that the Circuit Courts’
analyses put too little emphasis on the sacred First Amendment rights to speech and
association when upholding these nondisclosure laws.
A. Scrutiny Analysis: Should the Courts use Strict or Exacting Scrutiny?

132. Id. (“[W]e would expect the Foundation to present evidence to show that, following
the National Journal’s unauthorized Schedule B disclose, its contributors were harassed or
threatened.”).
133. Id. at 1019 (“As applied to the plaintiffs . . . the Attorney General’s Schedule B
requirements survives exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”).
134. Id. at 1020.
135. As indicated in Parts I and II of this Note, providing disclosure statements to more
governmental officials than necessary could result in a number of consequences to the
organization, including a loss of members. Furthermore, the individuals who were previously
a part of the organization would no longer have a safe place to express their views.
136. See, e.g., Hans Van Spakovsky, California Violating First Amendment with
Charitable Donations Disclosure Mandate, CNS NEWS (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/hans-von-spakovsky/california-violating-americansfirst-amendment-rights-disclosure [https://perma.cc/VS38-PWYF] (“The 9th Circuit is going
against the spirit of one of the most famous and important decision of the Supreme Court
during the height of the civil rights era, NAACP v. Alabama . . . .”); Luke Wachob, Four
Constitutional Red Flags in State Disclosure Laws, INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH (Aug. 7, 2018)
https://www.ifs.org/research/four-constitutional-red-flags-in-state-disclosure-laws/
[https://perma.cc/3L64-SSNH] (“[N]umerous state legislatures have considered
constitutionally-dubious proposals to force [nonprofit] organizations to publicly expose their
supporters’ names and home addresses.”).
137. Americans
for
Prosperity
Foundation
v.
Becerra,
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/americans-for-prosperity-foundation-v-becerra/
[https://perma.cc/Z2LD-6BWP]. On February 24, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United
States invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States,
and on January 8, 2021, the petition was granted. To date, the litigation is still pending. Id.
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Both the Second and the Ninth Circuits applied an exacting level of scrutiny, as
opposed to conducting a strict scrutiny analysis. The Supreme Court in NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson clearly instructed that “state action which may have the
effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.” 138
While the term “closest scrutiny” has never been specifically defined, a majority of
the freedom of association cases that came before the 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision
reference a “compelling interest,” indicating that “closest scrutiny” can be equated
with “strict.” 139 The Buckley court misconstrued the term “closest scrutiny,” stating
“[s]ince NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson we have required that the
subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny.” 140 Precedent
cases both before and after Buckley indicate rather than adhering to Buckley’s
proposition, the Court has instead equated “closest” scrutiny to “strict.” 141 Case law
not only supports the use of strict scrutiny, but also suggests strict scrutiny is the best
option to ensure the enforcement of the ideals and protections of the First
Amendment.
The need for the “closest” scrutiny is two-fold: the freedom to associate provides
minority groups a forum to express their ideas, and allows an individual the
opportunity to express themselves as part of a collective, thereby generating more
power to their cause. 142 Instead of relying on this traditional line of reasoning, the
courts in Schneiderman and Becerra looked to the disclosure requirement doctrine
used in campaign financing cases, such as Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United v.
FEC, and determined that if strict scrutiny did not apply in the realm of campaign
finance law then it certainly should not apply to nonprofit charities. 143 This view
incorrectly analogizes the two types of organizations and their purposes.
Firstly, and most importantly, the governmental need for information regarding
the election process strongly outweighs an individual’s interest in keeping their
campaign contributions confidential. Disclosures in the campaign finance context are
necessary in preventing campaign corruption and ensuring voters are fully informed

138. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460–61.
139. Brief for Liberty Justice Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners for Writ of
Certiorari, Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 4 (2019). See also NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a
compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power
to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.”); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (“[T]he State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling.”). Accord with Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm.,
371 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (“[T]he State convincingly [must] show a substantial relation
between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.”).
140. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
141. See supra notes 17, 139 and accompanying text.
142. Randall P. Bexanson, Sheila A. Bentzen & C. Michale Judd, Mapping the Forms of
Expressive Association, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 28–29 (2012) (“The collective voice formed by
expressive association is often more powerful than an individual voice, warranting greater
protection.”).
143. See supra notes 79–80, 113 and accompanying text (offering the opinion that political
speech should be awarded some of the greatest First Amendment protections).

118

I N DI A NA LA W J OU R NA L S U PP LE ME NT

[Vol. 96:102

when deciding who to elect into office. 144 Government officials are especially
concerned with the risk of quid pro quo corruption and misappropriation of public
assets by elected officeholders. 145 Thus, the Supreme Court carved out an exception
to applying strict scrutiny to an expressive association right in the realm of campaign
finance because public need demanded it. 146 In contrast, an individual’s decision to
contribute to a nonprofit charity has minimal, if any, necessity to be known by the
public. 147 Therefore, it stands to reason that the interest of the individual is much
stronger than that of the government. Furthermore, there is no concern of quid pro
quo corruption in the realm of charities, as elected board members of 501(c)(3)
organizations do not require substantial monetary assets to win an oversight position
within the charity. 148 Additionally, there is no risk of denying the public essential
information, as both state statutes, as well as the IRS regulation, require the Schedule
B donor information to be kept confidential by the government. 149
While there are some who believe the reduced scrutiny standard should be
inapplicable even in the context of campaign finance, 150 that debate is outside the
scope of this Note. Instead, the central argument of this Part is that the interests at
stake in Schneiderman and Becerra are much more comparable to that in NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson than the interests at stake in Citizens United v. FEC. By
compelling charities to disclose personal information about their donors, there is a

144. Brief for The Institute for Free Speech as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners for
Writ of Certiorari, Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 6 (2019).
145. Id. (“[The] risk [of quid pro quo corruption] is sui generis, grounded in the specific
fear that officeholders will sell public acts for private gain.”) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 27 (1976)).
146. Id. (“[T]he Buckley Court accepted limited donor disclosure in the campaign context
only after it was presented with a substantial record that suggested that such a disclosure was
essential to preventing official corruption and providing the electorate with information when
casting ballots.”). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1976).
147. See Brief of the Philanthropy Roundtable et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
for Writ of Certiorari, Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Beccerra, 18–19 (2019) (“There is no
statute specifically authorizing bulk collection by the State and certainly no legislative finding
of a relation between the bulk-disclosure requirement and a compelling state interest.”). See
also id. at 20 (“The IRS recognizes that requiring disclosure as needed on a case-by-case basis
. . . preserves IRS resources otherwise dedicated to the statutorily required redaction of certain
information . . . .”).
148. See
“Board
Recruitment
Process,”
BoardSource,
https://boardsource.org/resources/board-recruitment-process/
[https://perma.cc/CD58PUDS]. (suggesting that creating a nonprofit board requires a recruitment process and
extension of invitations, as opposed to the cost of actively campaigning for the position often
seen in the political context).
149. See 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d)(3)(A), N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13 § 96.2, CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 310. See also Brief for The Institute for Free Speech as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners for Writ of Certiorari, Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 4 (2019)
(“There is no public informational interest at issue, as the Attorney General claims that he will
keep the information confidential.”).
150. See, e.g., Nicole L. Jones, Comment, Citizens United Round II: Campaign Finance
Disclosure, the First Amendment, and Expanding Exemptions and Loopholes for Corporate
Influence on Elections, 93 DENV. L. REV. 749, 763–65 (identifying recent challenges to
campaign finance disclosure in the Tenth Circuit).
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risk of chilling the speech of both the affected charitable organizations who are losing
contributors, as well as the individuals who no longer feel they have access to a forum
where they are free to express their beliefs. These freedoms to voice an opinion,
especially one with which many do not agree, and to associate oneself with others of
a similar mind, whether it be publicly or privately, should be subject to the protection
of a strict scrutiny analysis by the courts.
One argument against changing the standard from exacting to strict scrutiny is
that the Supreme Court, in McConnell v. FEC, inserted a safeguard into the exacting
scrutiny analysis when they emphasized that as-applied challenges to disclosure
requirements would continue to be permissible. 151 Putting aside the fact that
McConnell is a campaign finance case, allowing for a case-by-case analysis of the
disclosure application has the possibility of unfairly situating unpopular nonprofit
charities. The plaintiffs in Schneiderman and Becerra, Citizens United and the
Americans for Prosperity Foundation respectively, have no shortage of assets to
expend on litigating these statutes. 152 If they are only allowed to bring as-applied
cases, and not facially challenge the statute, these types of more lucrative
organizations are prevented from speaking for other, smaller interest groups who
express controversial, minority views but do not have the funds to litigate for
themselves. Thus, these charities face an even higher risk of having their speech
chilled and have no way to fight for their First Amendment protections. This
argument also falls short from another perspective: In today’s polarized society,
allowing every nonprofit charity with the monetary capacity to litigate the
opportunity to do so has the potential of creating a logistical, inefficient mess within
the court system. To avoid the shortcomings with as-applied challenges, it is best to
simply restore the strict scrutiny requirement and prohibit the state from compelling
private information that violates the right to expressive association.
Even in the wake of Buckley, many lower courts continued to adhere to the stricter
standard outlined in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. 153 Furthermore, outside
of the realm of campaign finance, the few instances in which the Supreme Court has
identified a compelling enough interest to justify membership disclosure have
pertained to concerns of violent and illegal activities. 154 These precedents, which
extend further back in time than the campaign finance cases, demonstrate the need

151. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
152. In 2017, Americans For Prosperity reported total net assets of over $4.9 million on
the organization’s annual Form 990. That same year, Citizens United reported total net assets
of over $1.1 million, as well as a net income of greater than $677,000. NONPROFIT EXPLORER,
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/911433368 [https://perma.cc/XK8KCLY2].
153. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Fla. For Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d 1281, 1294
n.7 (11th Cir. 1982) (“NAACP v. Alabama . . . made clear that any state action infringing upon
associational rights was subject to strict scrutiny.”).
154. See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (determining a New Hampshire
subpoena requiring the revelation of members at a Communist camp was allowed because of
the dangers the Communist movement posed to society); Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63
(1928) (finding a New York statute requiring organizations known for violence and
intimidation, such as the Ku Klux Klan, to submit a copy of its organizational rules and
member oaths to the state was constitutional).

120

I N DI A NA LA W J OU R NA L S U PP LE ME NT

[Vol. 96:102

for a higher level of scrutiny. Ultimately, because the statutes in question should fail
exacting scrutiny, 155 they would certainly fail strict scrutiny. Thus, the re-elevation
of these cases to a heightened level of court scrutiny is largely symbolic but necessary
to demonstrate the fundamental commitment this country should hold to protecting
vitally important First Amendment freedoms.
B. A Re-Evaluation of Schneiderman and Becerra Under an Exacting Scrutiny
Analysis
Should the courts decline to re-extend strict scrutiny protections to disclosure
requirements of nonprofit charities, it is not entirely clear that an exacting scrutiny
analysis should have resulted in striking down laws like those at issue in
Schneiderman and Becerra. Exacting scrutiny requires “a substantial relation
between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental
interest’ where ‘the strength of the governmental interest’ is commensurate with ‘the
seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.’” 156 Section III.B.1
argues that a closer look at the evidence in each case suggests that the actual First
Amendment burden is larger than the opinions suggest. Section III.B.2 argues that
the governmental interest is not as great as the appellate courts believed, or at least
that such an interest is not substantially related to disclosure requirement.
1. Exacting Scrutiny: The Actual Burden on First Amendment Rights
For some charitable organizations, the burden imposed by requiring personal
information about contributors to be disclosed may be crippling. Such a requirement
also infringes on the rights of the individuals who wish to privately contribute to
charitable causes they support. Some donors, especially those who donate high-dollar
amounts and would thus be subject to Schedule B disclosure, find anonymity to be
essential to their willingness to donate. 157 The reasons for anonymity vary by donor
but can include religious or philosophical purposes 158 or for procedural reasons, such
as wishing to hide the fact an individual is wealthy or to shield the donor from
incessant requests from other charitable causes. 159 There are also countless moral

155. See infra Part III.B.
156. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (citing to Citizens United v. Schneiderman,
882 F.3d 374 (2018)).
157. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167
(2002) (“The decision to favor anonymity may be motivated out of fear of economic or official
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of
one’s privacy as possible”) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 34–
42 (1995)).
158. Brief for Philanthropy Roundtable et al as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners for
Writ of Certiorari, Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 9, 11 (2019) (“Many donors who
desire to remain anonymous are motivated by deeply held religious or moral beliefs that have
made anonymous philanthropic giving the norm when it comes to charity over the past two
millennia.”) (“[S]ome donors choose to give anonymously for philosophical or personal
concerns that the revelation of their identify might overshadow the efforts of charity.”).
159. Paul G. Schervish, “The Sound of One Hand Clapping: The Case For and Against
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purposes for not wanting to donate publicly, including the promotion of selflessness
in giving or even to shield the contributor from public embarrassment. 160 For any
combination of these reasons, public disclosure requirements of charitable donation
information creates a possibility that these donors will no longer contribute to their
preferred organizations.
There is also the fear that for highly polarized organizations, such as the plaintiffs
in Becerra, public association could subject donors to threats or harassment. In their
brief challenging the disclosure requirement in California, The Americans for
Prosperity Foundation described a variety of harms targeted at their members, such
as extreme threats and attacks on the organization including a bomb threat, as well
as acts of violence including death threats or business boycotts towards individuals
identified as members of the organization. 161 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
possibility that the risk of harm may deter some individuals from supporting
charitable organizations such as the plaintiff entities but found this does not satisfy
the threshold “substantial burden” on First Amendment rights. 162
When combining the risk of obstruction on the rights of both the charitable
organizations, as well as the individuals who may now be precluded from
contributing or associating with such entities, there is an apparent, and substantial,
First Amendment burden. In fact, some individuals who place a high value on the
privacy of their charitable dollars may lose their expressive association and speech
rights entirely. 163 The circuit courts in reaching their decisions put forth two logical
and convincing arguments with significant merit to aid the government: (1) that the
risk of privacy intrusion, or subsequent harm from donor disclosures, is drastically
reduced because state officials are prohibited from publicly releasing Schedule B
information and (2) only very large donors, which constitute very few individuals,
are impacted by the disclosure requirements. 164 Addressing each in turn, however,
reveals each of their shortcomings.
Facially, charitable organizations and their contributors are protected from public
harassment or disdain because the state is supposedly prohibited from publicly
disclosing donor information. As emphasized in Becerra, however, a promise to keep

Anonymous Giving,” 5 VOLUNTAS: INT’L J. OF VOLUNTARY AND NONPROFIT ORGS. 1, 4, 6
(1994) (“The . . . rationale for anonymity includes . . . circumventing feelings of
embarrassment about being wealthy or philanthropic; . . . empowering recipients by granting
them leeway in how they may use donations; shielding the giver from subsequent requests;
and fulfilling the donor’s desire to lead a private lifestyle.”).
160. Id. at 8–10 “([R]emaining hidden helps donors transcend the corrupting lures of
wealth and philanthropy.”) (emphasis in original).
161. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 29–30, Ams. for Prosperity Found. v.
Harris, Nos. 16-55727 & 16-55786 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2017).
162. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
163. Should the desire to remain anonymous trump the willingness to donate, the donor
has now lost their opportunity to associate with other like-minded individuals. See Brief for
Philanthropy Roundtable et al as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners for Writ of Certiorari,
Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 16–17 (2019) (“Revelation of private donations to
right-leaning and left-leaning causes alike have led to harassment and threats of boycotts. It is
no wonder donors across the political spectrum, especially supporters of politically unpopular
causes, prefer to exercise their First Amendment right to give anonymously.”).
164. See supra notes 65, 90, 126 and accompanying test.
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information private means little if the information somehow still becomes publicly
available after being disclosed to the state. 165 The plaintiffs in Becerra thoroughly
demonstrated that the state of California has systematically failed to protect donor
information that it is mandated by statute to remain confidential. 166 In fact, over 1770
Schedule Bs were available on the State of California’s website at the time the
plaintiffs were preparing for trial at the district court level, including those of
polarizing organizations such as Planned Parenthood. 167 The Ninth Circuit cast this
concern aside by acknowledging the new protocols the state had in place to prevent
future disclosure mistakes. 168 The court, however, had no solution for the human
error component of these disclosure violations and, instead, blindly trusted the state
to act less negligently in the future. 169 The states thus far have not proven themselves
to be worthy of such trust. Accordingly, the courts unreasonably trivialized the risks
nonprofit charities face with mandated disclosure requirements of sensitive
contributor information.
The appellate courts also relied on the fact that very few donors are affected by
these disclosure requirements to explain away the First Amendment burden on the
plaintiffs in Schneiderman and Becerra. 170 While it is true that only donors meeting
certain contribution thresholds must be disclosed, these are the donors on which
charitable organizations rely most heavily for funding. 171 Furthermore, those with
significant wealth are more likely to exhibit many of the attitudes and opinions that
lead to donors wanting to remain anonymous. 172 Those organizations promoting
minority or controversial opinions, and who accordingly have a smaller pool of
supporters from which to garner funds, will certainly be “substantially burdened” if

165. See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1018 (2018) (“We agree
that, in the past, the Attorney General’s office has not maintained Schedule B information as
securely as it should have, and we agree with the plaintiffs that this history raises a serious
concern.”).
166. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 18–19, Ams. v. Harris, Nos. 16-55727
& 16-55786 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2017). See also Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1018 (describing the
plaintiffs’ ability to demonstrate flaws in the Attorney General’s server and access Schedule
Bs during trial as well as the misclassification of over 1800 Schedule Bs as public
information).
167. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 19, Ams. v. Harris, Nos. 16-55727 &
16-55786 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2017) (“[The Plaintiffs] discovered 1778 Schedule Bs posted on
the Registry’s website, hundreds of which had been publicly available for years and dozens of
which were posted during the pendency of this litigation.”).
168. See supra notes 126, 127 and accompanying text.
169. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1018–19 (“Nothing is perfectly secure on the internet in 2018 . .
. but this factor alone does not establish a significant risk of public disclosure.”).
170. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1015 (“The Schedule B requirement . . . is not a sweeping one.
It requires the [plaintiffs] to disclose only their dozen or so largest contributors.”).
171. Ellie Buteau & Hannah Martin, Nonprofits Increasingly Reliant on Major Donors,
FOR
EFFECTIVE
PHILANTHROPY
(Sept.
26,
2019),
Study
Finds,
CTR.
https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/nonprofits-increasingly-reliant-on-major-donorsstudy-finds [https://perma.cc/6CZB-8GM6] (“[N]onprofit leaders are spending more time
building personal relationships with major donors as those gifts become larger and . . . [these
leaders] expect the trend to continue.”).
172. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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they were to lose even one significant donor because of these disclosure
requirements. 173
Thus, the additional taxing burden placed on First Amendment rights by these
disclosure requirements on both individuals wanting to associate with certain
organizations and those organizations wanting to promote their viewpoints is large
enough to be considered “substantial.” If more fully analyzed by other courts, this
burden could change the outcome of the interest-weighing analysis conducted under
exacting scrutiny.
2. Exacting Scrutiny: The Governmental Interest at Play
Not only is the First Amendment burden to nonprofit charities larger than it
initially appears, it is also not clear that the governmental interest is as strongly
related to the disclosure requirements as the Second and Ninth Circuit courts
presumed. Both courts found that the state had a sufficiently important governmental
interest in the information provided in the Schedule B disclosures because that
information helped the states efficiently identify and put a stop to charitable fraud. 174
They further reasoned that the state’s desire to inspect these records was acceptable
because the same exact information is required to be submitted to the IRS on an
annual basis. 175 This is perhaps the most compelling argument the courts presented
in determining that the state disclosure requirements were acceptable. However,
since the 2018 decisions were reached in Schneiderman and Becerra, the federal
government has reevaluated its own tax-exempt procedures and mandated
disclosures. 176 As a result, the strength of the appellate courts’ reasoning has
sufficiently diminished.
In early 2018, the IRS released Rev. Proc. 2018-38, with the following stated
purpose: “[Organizations exempt from tax under § 501(s) of the Internal Revenue
Code, other than § 501(c)(3) organizations] are no longer required to report the
names and addresses of their contributors on the Schedule B of their Forms 990 or
990-EZ.” 177 501(c)(3) organizations were excluded from this change because the
Schedule B information is explicitly listed as a disclosure requirement under another
portion of the Internal Revenue Code. 178
In evaluating this change, the Journal of Accountancy noted:

173. See Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1014 (requiring a substantial burden on First Amendment
rights to be present before the First Amendment shield can be raised).
174. See supra notes 84–86, 116–18 and accompanying text (summarizing the Second and
Ninth circuits’ analysis of the governmental interest in collecting Schedule B forms).
175. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 177–179 and accompanying text.
177. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6033-2 (2018).
178. See I.R.C. § 6033(b)(5). Many suspect that 501(c)(3) organizations would be included
“but for the statutory impediments in doing so.” Brief for Philanthropy Roundtable et al as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners for Writ of Certiorari, Ams. for Prosperity Found. v.
Becerra, 9, 11 (2019) (citing Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting
Requirements of Exempt Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 47447, 47452 (Sept. 10, 2019)
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-09-10/pdf/2019-19501.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22WQ-WYAE]).
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The IRS has determined that it does not need the personally identifiable
information of donors to be reported on Schedule B to carry out its duties,
and the requirement increases tax-exempt organizations' compliance
costs, takes up the IRS's time to redact the information, and poses a risk
of inadvertent disclosure of donor information that is not supposed to be
open to public inspection. 179
It is important to note that some of the states were not happy with this change,
which resulted in several states suing the IRS. In Bullock v. IRS, a federal district
court temporarily struck down the change to the code, holding that the IRS could
only make a final decision after the appropriate notice-and-comment procedure,
which would allow the states and other interested parties to weigh in and provide
data and statistics for and against the IRS’s proposed decision. 180 Nevertheless, the
final regulations went into effect on May 28, 2020. 181
While this federal change does not directly apply to 501(c)(3) organizations,, it
certainly provides powerful evidence that the information gained by the government
from the Schedule Bs is not nearly as useful to the government as the states
suggested. Furthermore, despite retaining the disclosure requirement for 501(c)(3)
organizations federally, there is nothing to suggest that the Schedule B information
is any more useful in a 501(c)(3) context than it is for other 501 organizations. Thus,
a more detailed analysis into how the states are using the information from the
Schedule B’s could possibly reveal such information to be insufficiently related to
the government’s interest in preventing charitable fraud.
One method of strengthening the relationship between the government’s interest
and the Schedule B disclosures is to only request or subpoena the information from
specific charities after investigations into the charities have begun, as the plaintiffs
in Becerra suggested. 182 The state argued this was inefficient and would likely tip
the charity off that the entity was being investigated. 183 While the investigation may
be slightly more inefficient, the state will be saving time that it no longer needs to
redact Schedule B information from other charitable disclosures that must be made

179. Sally P. Schreiber, Many Tax-Exempt Organizations No Longer Need to List Donor
(July
17,
2018),
Information,
JOURNALOFACCOUNTANCY.COM
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2018/jul/tax-exempt-organizations-donorinformation-201819335.html [https://perma.cc/U3NC-8UK4].
180. No. CV-18-103-GF-BMM, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126921, at *32 (D. Mont. July 30,
2019). Following the order, the IRS properly reissued the proposed regulations and opened a
comments period to last through December 9, 2019. Alexander Reid & Chelsea Rubin, IRS
Reissues Donor Disclosure Relief as Proposed Regulations, MORGAN LEWIS: LAW FLASH
ALERT (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/irs-reissues-donor-disclosurerelief-as-89495/ [https://perma.cc/KSS8-VP4G].
181 James J. Joyce et. al, IRS Issues Final Regulations on Donor Reporting Requirements for
Tax-Exempt Organizations, ARNOLD & PORTER (JUNE 12, 2020),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2020/06/irs-issues-finalregulations-on-donor-reporting [https://perma.cc/VU4J-UZZ8].
182. Becerra, 903 F.3d at 1010.
183. Id. at 1010–11 (quoting many witnesses who testified for the state about their concerns
regarding limited Schedule B collection).
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public. 184 This time can instead be used for conducting more investigations and
obtaining additional information. Thus, changing the point in time in which the
Schedule B is requested is one way to combat the expansive breadth of the disclosure
statutes without eliminating the disclosure completely.
Ultimately, even under an exacting scrutiny analysis as opposed to a strict scrutiny
analysis, there is still ample evidence to suggest that disclosure requirements, even
content neutral ones, in the context of nonprofit entities, including 501(c)(3)
organizations, should not be upheld and the decisions reached in Becerra and
Schneiderman should be reconsidered.
CONCLUSION
The Freedom of Association has become an essential aspect of protecting First
Amendment Free Speech rights. These rights belong to all individuals and should not
be infringed upon except in the most extreme of circumstances. Throughout history,
with the exception of the realm of campaign finance laws, courts have almost
exclusively applied strict scrutiny to statutes that appear to be infringing on
associative rights or chilling free speech. In regard to nonprofit disclosure laws,
however, two appellate courts upheld the statutes under an exacting scrutiny analysis,
despite their potential to chill speech for individuals and organizations that promote
more controversial opinions and ideas. In order to maintain a reverence for the ideals
enshrined in the First Amendment, the courts should restore a strict scrutiny analysis
to these types of disclosures.
By forcing nonprofit organizations to disclose personal information about their
most prominent and high-dollar donors, there is a risk that some of these donors will
no longer wish to contribute, whether it be because of a desire to remain anonymous
or due to a fear of public backlash and retaliation. Not only are these organizations
running the risk of losing a significant income stream, it is possible this will greatly
reduce these entities’ ability to educate, raise awareness, or otherwise meet their
charitable goals. Furthermore, individuals have now lost the ability to associate
privately with others who share similar ideals, which also has the effect of chilling
speech. Accordingly, these rights should be awarded strict scrutiny protection to
avoid being infringed upon.
Even if the courts decide to apply an exacting scrutiny analysis, the disclosure
requirements should not stand. These types of statutes place a significant burden on
the organizations and their donors, and at this point in time, it is unclear if the
information obtained from Schedule Bs is beneficial in preventing charitable fraud.
Thus, it is best to avoid compelling disclosure on nonprofit organizations that are
properly complying with other mandated procedures and taking honest steps towards
reaching their charitable goals.
Should the current law, as established in Becerra and Schneiderman, continue as
legitimate precedent, it is possible that the position of smaller charitable

184. See Brief for Philanthropy Roundtable et al as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
for Writ of Certiorari, Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 20 (2019) (“The IRS recognizes
that requiring disclosure as needed on a case-by-case basis . . . preserves IRS resources
otherwise dedicated to the statutorily required redaction of certain information, and reduces
the inadvertent risk of individuals’ private information.”).
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organizations promoting controversial opinions may continue to deteriorate. Should
major donors decide they no longer wish to be involved, the organization will lose a
significant source of funding. Furthermore, they will not have the resources to bring
an as-applied challenge to the disclosure statutes. Thus, if an entity becomes
insolvent, it will be forced to cease operations, removing its opinions from the
marketplace of ideas and eliminating the opportunity for like-minded individuals to
bond. It will ultimately be for the Supreme Court to decide what tier of scrutiny
should be applied and what exactly will withstand such analysis. Whatever decision
they reach has the potential to affect thousands of nonprofits across the nation.

